The Wycheproof test suite is extensive, but takes a long time to
complete on CI.
Keep only the most relevant ones and take it as an opportunity to describe
what they are.
The remaining ones are still available for manual testing when required.
I noticed this by stress testing my tls server implementation. From time to time curl (and other tools: ab, vegeta) will report invalid signature. I trace the problem to the way how std lib is encoding raw signature into der format. Using raw signature I got in some cases different encoding using std and openssl. Std is not producing minimal der when signature `r` or `s` integers has leading zero(es).
Here is an example to illustrate difference. Notice leading 00 in `s`
integer which is removed in openssl encoding but not in std encoding.
```Zig
const std = @import("std");
test "ecdsa signature to der" {
// raw signature r and s bytes
const raw = hexToBytes(
\\ 49 63 0c 94 95 2e ff 4b 02 bf 35 c4 97 9e a7 24
\\ 20 dc 94 de aa 1b 17 ff e1 49 25 3e 34 ef e8 d0
\\ c4 43 aa 7b a9 f3 9c b9 f8 72 7d d7 0c 9a 13 1e
\\
\\ 00 56 85 43 d3 d4 05 62 a1 1d d8 a1 45 44 b5 dd
\\ 62 9f d1 e0 ab f1 cd 4a 85 d0 1f 5d 11 d9 f8 89
\\ 89 d4 59 0c b0 6e ea 3c 19 6a f7 0b 1a 4a ce f1
);
// encoded by openssl
const expected = hexToBytes(
\\ 30 63 02 30
\\ 49 63 0c 94 95 2e ff 4b 02 bf 35 c4 97 9e a7 24
\\ 20 dc 94 de aa 1b 17 ff e1 49 25 3e 34 ef e8 d0
\\ c4 43 aa 7b a9 f3 9c b9 f8 72 7d d7 0c 9a 13 1e
\\
\\ 02 2f
\\ 56 85 43 d3 d4 05 62 a1 1d d8 a1 45 44 b5 dd
\\ 62 9f d1 e0 ab f1 cd 4a 85 d0 1f 5d 11 d9 f8 89
\\ 89 d4 59 0c b0 6e ea 3c 19 6a f7 0b 1a 4a ce f1
);
// encoded by std
const actual = hexToBytes(
\\ 30 64 02 30
\\ 49 63 0c 94 95 2e ff 4b 02 bf 35 c4 97 9e a7 24
\\ 20 dc 94 de aa 1b 17 ff e1 49 25 3e 34 ef e8 d0
\\ c4 43 aa 7b a9 f3 9c b9 f8 72 7d d7 0c 9a 13 1e
\\
\\ 02 30
\\ 00 56 85 43 d3 d4 05 62 a1 1d d8 a1 45 44 b5 dd
\\ 62 9f d1 e0 ab f1 cd 4a 85 d0 1f 5d 11 d9 f8 89
\\ 89 d4 59 0c b0 6e ea 3c 19 6a f7 0b 1a 4a ce f1
);
_ = actual;
const Ecdsa = std.crypto.sign.ecdsa.EcdsaP384Sha384;
const sig = Ecdsa.Signature.fromBytes(raw);
var buf: [Ecdsa.Signature.der_encoded_length_max]u8 = undefined;
const encoded = sig.toDer(&buf);
try std.testing.expectEqualSlices(u8, &expected, encoded);
}
pub fn hexToBytes(comptime hex: []const u8) [removeNonHex(hex).len / 2]u8 {
@setEvalBranchQuota(1000 * 100);
const hex2 = comptime removeNonHex(hex);
comptime var res: [hex2.len / 2]u8 = undefined;
_ = comptime std.fmt.hexToBytes(&res, hex2) catch unreachable;
return res;
}
fn removeNonHex(comptime hex: []const u8) []const u8 {
@setEvalBranchQuota(1000 * 100);
var res: [hex.len]u8 = undefined;
var i: usize = 0;
for (hex) |c| {
if (std.ascii.isHex(c)) {
res[i] = c;
i += 1;
}
}
return res[0..i];
}
```
Trimming leading zeroes from signature integers fixes encoding.
Our key pair creation API was ugly and inconsistent between ecdsa
keys and other keys.
The same `generate()` function can now be used to generate key pairs,
and that function cannot fail.
For deterministic keys, a `generateDeterministic()` function is
available for all key types.
Fix comments and compilation of the benchmark by the way.
Fixes#21002
Due to the `std.crypto.ecdsa.KeyPair.create` taking and optional of seed, even if the seed is generated, cross-compiling to the environments without standard random source (eg. wasm) (`std.crypto.random.bytes`) will fail to compile.
This commit changes the API of the problematic function and moves the random seed generation to a new utility function.
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-185.pdf
This adds useful standard SHA3-based constructions from the
NIST SP 800-185 document:
- cSHAKE: similar to the SHAKE extensible hash function, but
with the addition of a context parameter.
- KMAC: SHAKE-based authentication / keyed XOF
- TupleHash: unambiguous hashing of tuples
These are required by recent protocols and specifications.
They also offer properties that none of the currently available
constructions in the stdlib offer, especially the ability to safely
hash tuples.
Other keyed hash functions/XOFs will fall back to using HMAC, which
is suboptimal from a performance perspective, but fine from a
security perspective.
Follow up to #19079, which made test names fully qualified.
This fixes tests that now-redundant information in their test names. For example here's a fully qualified test name before the changes in this commit:
"priority_queue.test.std.PriorityQueue: shrinkAndFree"
and the same test's name after the changes in this commit:
"priority_queue.test.shrinkAndFree"
This reverts commit 0c99ba1eab, reversing
changes made to 5f92b070bf.
This caused a CI failure when it landed in master branch due to a
128-bit `@byteSwap` in std.mem.
Most of this migration was performed automatically with `zig fmt`. There
were a few exceptions which I had to manually fix:
* `@alignCast` and `@addrSpaceCast` cannot be automatically rewritten
* `@truncate`'s fixup is incorrect for vectors
* Test cases are not formatted, and their error locations change
Similar to what was done for EdDSA, allow incremental creation
and verification of ECDSA signatures.
Doing so for ECDSA is trivial, and can be useful for TLS as well
as the future package manager.
This commit accepts unusual parameters like EcdsaP384Sha256.
Some certifictes(below certs are in /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt on Ubuntu 22.04) use EcdsaP384Sha256 to sign itself.
- Subject: C=GR, L=Athens, O=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions Cert. Authority, CN=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions ECC RootCA 2015
- Subject: C=US, ST=Texas, L=Houston, O=SSL Corporation, CN=SSL.com EV Root Certification Authority ECC
- Subject: C=US, ST=Texas, L=Houston, O=SSL Corporation, CN=SSL.com Root Certification Authority ECC
In verify(), hash array `h` is allocated to be larger than the scalar.encoded_length.
The array is regarded as big-endian.
Hash values are filled in the back of the array and the rest bytes in front are filled with zero.
In sign(), the hash array is allocated and filled as same as verify().
In deterministicScalar(), hash bytes are insufficient to generate `k`
To generate `k` without narrowing its value range,
this commit uses algorithm stage h. in "Section 3.2 Generation of k" in RFC6979.
A hash function cascade was a common way to avoid length-extension
attacks with traditional hash functions such as the SHA-2 family.
Add `std.crypto.hash.composition` to do exactly that using arbitrary
hash functions, and pre-define the common SHA2-based ones.
With this, we can now sign and verify Bitcoin signatures in pure Zig.
ECDSA is the most commonly used signature scheme today, mainly for
historical and conformance reasons. It is a necessary evil for
many standard protocols such as TLS and JWT.
It is tricky to implement securely and has been the root cause of
multiple security disasters, from the Playstation 3 hack to multiple
critical issues in OpenSSL and Java.
This implementation combines lessons learned from the past with
recent recommendations.
In Zig, the NIST curves that ECDSA is almost always instantied with
use formally verified field arithmetic, giving us peace of mind
even on edge cases. And the API rejects neutral elements where it
matters, and unconditionally checks for non-canonical encoding for
scalars and group elements. This automatically eliminates common
vulnerabilities such as https://sk.tl/2LpS695v .
ECDSA's security heavily relies on the security of the random number
generator, which is a concern in some environments.
This implementation mitigates this by computing deterministic
nonces using the conservative scheme from Pornin et al. with the
optional addition of randomness as proposed in Ericsson's
"Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional Randomness"
document. This approach mitigates both the implications of a weak RNG
and the practical implications of fault attacks.
Project Wycheproof is a Google project to test crypto libraries against
known attacks by triggering edge cases. It discovered vulnerabilities
in virtually all major ECDSA implementations.
The entire set of ECDSA-P256-SHA256 test vectors from Project Wycheproof
is included here. Zero defects were found in this implementation.
The public API differs from the Ed25519 one. Instead of raw byte strings
for keys and signatures, we introduce Signature, PublicKey and SecretKey
structures.
The reason is that a raw byte representation would not be optimal.
There are multiple standard representations for keys and signatures,
and decoding/encoding them may not be cheap (field elements have to be
converted from/to the montgomery domain).
So, the intent is to eventually move ed25519 to the same API, which
is not going to introduce any performance regression, but will bring
us a consistent API, that we can also reuse for RSA.
