This removes the two original implementations in favour of the single
generic one based on the Algorithm type. Previously we had three, very
similar implementations which was somewhat confusing when knowing what
one should actually be used.
The previous polynomials all have equivalent variants available when
using the Algorithm type.
A volume can be mounted as a NTFS path, e.g. as C:\Mnt\Foo. In that case, IOCTL_MOUNTMGR_QUERY_POINTS gives us a mount point with a symlink value something like `\??\Volume{383da0b0-717f-41b6-8c36-00500992b58d}`. In order to get the `C:\Mnt\Foo` path, we can query the mountmgr again using IOCTL_MOUNTMGR_QUERY_DOS_VOLUME_PATH.
Fixes#19731
* Adjust buffer length a bit.
* Fix detecting if file is a script. Logic below was unreachable,
because 99% of scripts failed "At least 255 bytes long" check and were detected as ELF files.
It should be "At least 4" instead (minimum value of "ELF magic length" and "smallest possible interpreter path length").
* Fix parsing interpreter path, when text after shebang:
1. does not have newline,
2. has leading spaces and tabs,
3. separates interpreter and arguments by tab or NUL.
* Remove empty error set from `defaultAbiAndDynamicLinker`.
Signed-off-by: Eric Joldasov <bratishkaerik@landless-city.net>
* std.crypto: make ff.ct_unprotected.limbsCmpLt compile
* std.crypto: add ff.ct test
* fix testCt to work on x86
* disable test on stage2-c
---------
Co-authored-by: Frank Denis <124872+jedisct1@users.noreply.github.com>
> Note: This first part is mostly a rephrasing of https://flatt.tech/research/posts/batbadbut-you-cant-securely-execute-commands-on-windows/
> See that article for more details
On Windows, it is possible to execute `.bat`/`.cmd` scripts via CreateProcessW. When this happens, `CreateProcessW` will (under-the-hood) spawn a `cmd.exe` process with the path to the script and the args like so:
cmd.exe /c script.bat arg1 arg2
This is a problem because:
- `cmd.exe` has its own, separate, parsing/escaping rules for arguments
- Environment variables in arguments will be expanded before the `cmd.exe` parsing rules are applied
Together, this means that (1) maliciously constructed arguments can lead to arbitrary command execution via the APIs in `std.process.Child` and (2) escaping according to the rules of `cmd.exe` is not enough on its own.
A basic example argv field that reproduces the vulnerability (this will erroneously spawn `calc.exe`):
.argv = &.{ "test.bat", "\"&calc.exe" },
And one that takes advantage of environment variable expansion to still spawn calc.exe even if the args are properly escaped for `cmd.exe`:
.argv = &.{ "test.bat", "%CMDCMDLINE:~-1%&calc.exe" },
(note: if these spawned e.g. `test.exe` instead of `test.bat`, they wouldn't be vulnerable; it's only `.bat`/`.cmd` scripts that are vulnerable since they go through `cmd.exe`)
Zig allows passing `.bat`/`.cmd` scripts as `argv[0]` via `std.process.Child`, so the Zig API is affected by this vulnerability. Note also that Zig will search `PATH` for `.bat`/`.cmd` scripts, so spawning something like `foo` may end up executing `foo.bat` somewhere in the PATH (the PATH searching of Zig matches the behavior of cmd.exe).
> Side note to keep in mind: On Windows, the extension is significant in terms of how Windows will try to execute the command. If the extension is not `.bat`/`.cmd`, we know that it will not attempt to be executed as a `.bat`/`.cmd` script (and vice versa). This means that we can just look at the extension to know if we are trying to execute a `.bat`/`.cmd` script.
---
This general class of problem has been documented before in 2011 here:
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/twistylittlepassagesallalike/everyone-quotes-command-line-arguments-the-wrong-way
and the course of action it suggests for escaping when executing .bat/.cmd files is:
- Escape first using the non-cmd.exe rules
- Then escape all cmd.exe 'metacharacters' (`(`, `)`, `%`, `!`, `^`, `"`, `<`, `>`, `&`, and `|`) with `^`
However, escaping with ^ on its own is insufficient because it does not stop cmd.exe from expanding environment variables. For example:
```
args.bat %PATH%
```
escaped with ^ (and wrapped in quotes that are also escaped), it *will* stop cmd.exe from expanding `%PATH%`:
```
> args.bat ^"^%PATH^%^"
"%PATH%"
```
but it will still try to expand `%PATH^%`:
```
set PATH^^=123
> args.bat ^"^%PATH^%^"
"123"
```
The goal is to stop *all* environment variable expansion, so this won't work.
Another problem with the ^ approach is that it does not seem to allow all possible command lines to round trip through cmd.exe (as far as I can tell at least).
One known example:
```
args.bat ^"\^"key^=value\^"^"
```
where args.bat is:
```
@echo %1 %2 %3 %4 %5 %6 %7 %8 %9
```
will print
```
"\"key value\""
```
(it will turn the `=` into a space for an unknown reason; other minor variations do roundtrip, e.g. `\^"key^=value\^"`, `^"key^=value^"`, so it's unclear what's going on)
It may actually be possible to escape with ^ such that every possible command line round trips correctly, but it's probably not worth the effort to figure it out, since the suggested mitigation for BatBadBut has better roundtripping and leads to less garbled command lines overall.
---
Ultimately, the mitigation used here is the same as the one suggested in:
https://flatt.tech/research/posts/batbadbut-you-cant-securely-execute-commands-on-windows/
The mitigation steps are reproduced here, noted with one deviation that Zig makes (following Rust's lead):
1. Replace percent sign (%) with %%cd:~,%.
2. Replace the backslash (\) in front of the double quote (") with two backslashes (\\).
3. Replace the double quote (") with two double quotes ("").
4. ~~Remove newline characters (\n).~~
- Instead, `\n`, `\r`, and NUL are disallowed and will trigger `error.InvalidBatchScriptArg` if they are found in `argv`. These three characters do not roundtrip through a `.bat` file and therefore are of dubious/no use. It's unclear to me if `\n` in particular is relevant to the BatBadBut vulnerability (I wasn't able to find a reproduction with \n and the post doesn't mention anything about it except in the suggested mitigation steps); it just seems to act as a 'end of arguments' marker and therefore anything after the `\n` is lost (and same with NUL). `\r` seems to be stripped from the command line arguments when passed through a `.bat`/`.cmd`, so that is also disallowed to ensure that `argv` can always fully roundtrip through `.bat`/`.cmd`.
5. Enclose the argument with double quotes (").
The escaped command line is then run as something like:
cmd.exe /d /e:ON /v:OFF /c "foo.bat arg1 arg2"
Note: Previously, we would pass `foo.bat arg1 arg2` as the command line and the path to `foo.bat` as the app name and let CreateProcessW handle the `cmd.exe` spawning for us, but because we need to pass `/e:ON` and `/v:OFF` to cmd.exe to ensure the mitigation is effective, that is no longer tenable. Instead, we now get the full path to `cmd.exe` and use that as the app name when executing `.bat`/`.cmd` files.
---
A standalone test has also been added that tests two things:
1. Known reproductions of the vulnerability are tested to ensure that they do not reproduce the vulnerability
2. Randomly generated command line arguments roundtrip when passed to a `.bat` file and then are passed from the `.bat` file to a `.exe`. This fuzz test is as thorough as possible--it tests that things like arbitrary Unicode codepoints and unpaired surrogates roundtrip successfully.
Note: In order for the `CreateProcessW` -> `.bat` -> `.exe` roundtripping to succeed, the .exe must split the arguments using the post-2008 C runtime argv splitting implementation, see https://github.com/ziglang/zig/pull/19655 for details on when that change was made in Zig.
ensureTotalCapacityPrecise only satisfies the assumptions made in the ArrayListImpl functions (that there's already enough capacity for the entire converted string if it's all ASCII) when the ArrayList has no items, otherwise it would hit illegal behavior.
Windows does not support RPATH and only searches for DLLs in a small
number of predetermined paths by default, with one of them being the
directory from which the application loaded.
Installing both executables and DLLs to `bin/` by default helps ensure
that the executable can find any DLL artifacts it has linked to.
DLL import libraries are still installed to `lib/`.
These defaults match CMake's behavior.
this patch renames ComptimeStringMap to StaticStringMap, makes it
accept only a single type parameter, and return a known struct type
instead of an anonymous struct. initial motivation for these changes
was to reduce the 'very long type names' issue described here
https://github.com/ziglang/zig/pull/19682.
this breaks the previous API. users will now need to write:
`const map = std.StaticStringMap(T).initComptime(kvs_list);`
* move `kvs_list` param from type param to an `initComptime()` param
* new public methods
* `keys()`, `values()` helpers
* `init(allocator)`, `deinit(allocator)` for runtime data
* `getLongestPrefix(str)`, `getLongestPrefixIndex(str)` - i'm not sure
these belong but have left in for now incase they are deemed useful
* performance notes:
* i posted some benchmarking results here:
https://github.com/travisstaloch/comptime-string-map-revised/issues/1
* i noticed a speedup reducing the size of the struct from 48 to 32
bytes and thus use u32s instead of usize for all length fields
* i noticed speedup storing KVs as a struct of arrays
* latest benchmark shows these wall_time improvements for
debug/safe/small/fast builds: -6.6% / -10.2% / -19.1% / -8.9%. full
output in link above.
